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Digital Chinese Whispers: Death Threats and Rumors Inside 
China’s Online Marketplace of Ideas 
January 17, 2012 in Uncategorized by The China Beat 
By James Leibold 
The Chinese internet is a wonderfully raucous and interesting place. It has greatly expanded the 
scope of public discourse and activity, despite the party-state’s extensive censorship regime. Not 
surprisingly, the world’s largest cyber-community exhibits tremendous depth and diversity: 
progressive cyber-activists and professional agitators; navel-gazing starlets and steam-venting 
gamers; mundane infotainment and the banal waxing of quotidian life; and, sadly, dark corners 
of fear, hatred and paranoia. It’s all there; it simply depends on where one looks. Like other 
technologies before it, the internet is normatively neutral, and thus can be put to good, bad and 
anodyne uses: individuals—not tools—shape the contours of different societies and their 
cultures. 
Yet, to date, Anglophone literature on the Chinese internet has tended to celebrate its liberating, 
subversive potential. The focus here is on those brave dissent-bloggers (Ai Weiwei, Murong 
Xuecun, Pi San, Zola, and others) who dare to speak truth to power while cleverly poking holes 
in the “Great Firewall of China.” In recently published books and articles, one finds numerous 
examples of whimsical yet biting digital parodies (grass-mud horses, river crabs, and steamed 
buns), online environmental and community activism (the PX and Green Dam incidents), cyber-
attacks on local corruption and vested interests (Li Gang Gate and human-flesh search engines), 
and even occasional open criticism of the Party and its leaders. These are examples of the “blog 
revolution” that Xiao Qiang, director of the China Internet Project at the University of California 
at Berkeley and its widely read China Digital Times (CDT) website, claims is sweeping China, 
and “shaking up the power balance between the people and the government of the world’s most 
populous nation.” 
In the latest issue of the Journal of Asian Studies, I put forward an alternative scenario (see 
“Blogging Alone” and Guobin Yang’s reply “Technology and Its Contents”). Without denying 
the significance of the above examples, I offer an outsider’s critique: an intervention informed 
by, but positioned outside, the burgeoning field of Chinese internet studies, and instead rooted in 
my own research on Han cyber-nationalism. In the article, I argue that the Sinophone internet is 
producing the same shallow infotainment, pernicious misinformation, and interest-based ghettos 
it has created elsewhere in the world, and these more prosaic elements need to be considered 
alongside the Chinese internet’s potential for creating new forms of civic activism and socio-
political change. 
￼ 
Here I want to take up one concrete example from the “dark side,” a tale which due to space 
limitations wasn’t included in my JAS article but provides some of the “content and context” that 
Guobin Yang rightfully suggests is missing from my article. It demonstrates, I would argue, the 
limits of the Chinese internet as a progressive, bottom-up “marketplace of ideas.” The sort of 
dynamic “online carnival” that Guobin Yang and others argue is increasing the transparency, 
accountability and “grassroots, citizen democracy” of Chinese society. 
Over the past four years, I have been engaged in a type of digital ethnography, which has taken 
me deep inside one of the small corners of the Chinese internet—a rather dark, sobering 
periphery inhabited by an increasingly truculent community of Han nationalists. As I have 
pointed out elsewhere, this community of several thousand hardcore members is extremely 
diverse, crossing both national and ideological barriers, but also passionately convinced that the 
Chinese party-state and its allies are intentionally undermining Han power and privilege. In 
seeking to draw attention to a regime of government policies that are rendering the once mighty 
Han race “second-class citizens,” Han cyber-nationalists have created a network of weblogs and 
BBS forums. Yet the deeper one probes into their online discussions and activism, the murkier 
truth and reality becomes. 
As part of my ongoing research, I published a short essay on China Beat analysing the group’s 
reaction to the immensely popular 2004 novel Wolf Totem (Lang tuteng 狼图腾). In the article, I 
described how Hanists view the novel as a despicable celebration of uncivilised and parasitic 
nomadic culture, which in the words of one of its leading members, was “actually preparing 
public opinion for the carrying out of racial genocide against the Han.” I also posited that this 
sort of cyber-racism seemed to be spilling over into Chinese streets, with the 2008-09 race riots 
in Lhasa, Shaoguan, and Ürümqi serving as an important reminder of how internet rage can whip 
the marginalized and socially dispossessed into bloody action. 
In March 2010, my China Beat article was translated on the Hanwang 汉网 BBS community 
(www.hanminzu.com), under the title: “Western article suggests: Hanwang incited the bloody 
attack on minorities during the Tibetan and Xinjiang riots,” and immediately elicited a flurry of 
discussion, with now over one hundred replies and cross-postings across the Sinophone internet. 
The seven year-old Hanwang community has over 120,000 registered members and attracts on 
average 2 million unique visitors per month, although this number tends to fluctuate wildly and 
was as high as 7 million in April 2010. 
I half-expected the sort of unreflective vitriol and spleen-venting that saw me labelled a “white 
skinned pig” (baipizhu 白皮猪) on Baidu Tieba 百度贴吧 and suggested elsewhere that I allow 
“the nomadic, war-like and democratic lupine culture,” which I clearly worshipped, “to trample 
on the naked belly of my wife.” But what really surprised me were the hollow death threats—I 
received two such warnings—and the way these threads quickly slipped into the realm of bogus 
babble and absurd conspiracy theories. 
Within hours of its translation, Hanwang members were already referring to my article as “the 
result of collusion between domestic tartars and Western Nazis.” This quickly led to extensive 
speculation about my ethnic heritage. Someone speculated that I was a Manchu sympathizer 
seeking to inflame Hanwang members. Noting that I was an academic in Australia, one blogger 
argued that my surname seemed German and the large number of Turkish migrants in Germany 
could help to explain my nomadic affinities. Others asserted that Leibold was actually a Muslim 
surname: “This tool is quite likely a Turk.” Another member piped in: “Although he is German, I 
bet he’s a minority,” and later asked: “Does anyone think that this guy has a Germanic 
demeanor?” Another contributor posted up a link to my La Trobe University webpage and photo, 
stating: “Leibold seems like a fairly common surname in Germany, but this doesn’t mean he is 
German as there are a large number of German migrants in America and Canada, as seems to 
also be the case in Australia.” 
Based on my photo and suggestions that I was trying to link Han nationalism with Nazi-style 
racism, another blogger concluded that I must be Jewish. This then lead to further speculation 
about my nose, with one member declaring it was not high enough like the typical Jewish and 
Palestinian noses. Others disagreed: “In my opinion, Middle Eastern people have beak-like 
noses, the bridge of the nose is not too high like Albert Einstein and Yassar Arafat.” 
For most Hanwang members, I represented yet another foreigner who hates the Chinese, 
especially its Han majority. Posts that moved beyond my physical appearance speculated instead 
on my connections with domestic and international forces opposing the Han. According to the 
translator of my article, I was part of a complex, international conspiracy ring that linked former 
Mongolian prince and failed independence leader Demchugdongrub with Harvard Professor John 
King Fairbank, and George Bush and Donald Rumsfeld of all people. 
In an attempt to reassure Hanwang members of my scholarly intentions while engaging them in a 
bit of honest dialogue, I posted a Chinese language reply to their comments on 3 June 2010. In 
my response, I pointed out (tactfully, I hope) that many of their comments reinforced my rather 
dim view of the Hanwang community, and its tendency to “spin conspiracy theories that are 
often wrapped in racial language.” But I also praised the Chinese internet’s ability to expand the 
scope of public discourse on issues as sensitive as ethnic relations, and acknowledged the 
legitimacy of some of their grievances. 
Despite some initial discussion about the PRC’s ethnic-based affirmative action policies, the 
thread once again descended into hysteria and name calling, with Hanwang members suggesting 
that—among other things—I was “insincere,” “crazy,” “savage-hearted,” and a “stupid liar” who 
was doing the dirty work of some spy agency. Admitting that he did not have any proof of my 
links with anti-China spy agencies, one blogger called on me to “please clarify the source of your 
research funding and why this funding body is willing to spend money so that you can 
understand our non-mainstream speech on the internet?” 
But before I could reply, I found myself banished from Hanwang. On 12 June 2010, Hanwang’s 
chief administrator intervened, stating that my original post triggered an attack on Hanwang by 
the censors and its closure to mainland-based netizens. “For the benefit of everyone that likes to 
browse, I’m afraid I can’t permit Mr Leibold to post any more comments on Hanwang. If Mr 
Leibold wants to post further explanations, I invite him to do so elsewhere.” In response to a plea 
from one overseas-based members about upholding freedom of speech on Hanwang, the 
administrator asserted: “Hanwang isn’t a place where ‘free discussion can occur’,” and that 
overseas members could not possibly understand the difficulties faced by those living and 
writing inside “the shield.” “In order to make sure that other netizens don’t lose out,” he 
concluded, “I ask you to go elsewhere to explain yourself. Thanks for your cooperation.” 
Rumors and conspiracy theories have long been a part of the fabric of human society. Yet in the 
era of instant communication—emails, SMS, and tweets—they can spread like wildfire 
throughout our communities, and produce disastrous consequences. This type of “counter-
knowledge” can easily damage markets, people, and institutions. On one level, the online 
musings of Han cyber-nationalists can be dismissed as outside the mainstream but innocuous. 
After all, we are talking about only a handful of China’s half a billion netizens. But rumors and 
hate speak can prove a toxic combination. Take the way in which online rumors touched off one 
of modern China’s deadliest race riots in Ürümqi. As Cass Sunstein has argued, misinformation 
spreads through two distinct yet interconnected processes—social cascades and group 
polarization—with both of these phenomena rampant on the Sinophone internet. 
The flow of information on the internet can resemble a game of Chinese whispers, with a story 
breaking in one corner before being tweeted, cross-posted and flamed across virtual networks. 
And when we lack any independent source of information, we tend to believe the views of 
others, especially if they come from those that share a similar ideological disposition or 
worldview as us. One can point to numerous examples of rumors on the Sinophone internet: 
there was the bizarre run on salt and iodine products following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
and the online hyping of the Li Gang incident last year. In terms of the latter, a recent 
investigative report by two Chinese journalists pinned the popular internet meme “Sue me if you 
can – my father is Li Gang” to an anonymous thread on the Tianya BBS Forum, and argues that 
a terrified, drunk and visibly shaken Li Qiming never uttered these now infamous words after 
running over two students on the campus of Hebei University. 
The problem of internet rumors is compounded by group polarization. Social psychologists have 
long identified the human tendency towards homophily, the seeking out of like-minded 
individuals in social spaces ranging from friendships, neighborhoods, playgrounds, and online 
communities. The filtering and point-casting power of the internet makes it even easier for us to 
live in information cocoons. And the biased ways in which we all process information means that 
the opinions of homophilic social circles tend to harden over time, allowing even the most 
preposterous rumors and conspiracy theories to find widespread acceptance. How else can we 
explain why a quarter of Americans still think President Obama wasn’t born in the United States 
and/or is a Muslim? Again, there are plenty of examples of group polarization on the Sinophone 
internet—from pop-star fan clubs to religious cults—and the popularity of anonymous BBS and 
micro-blogging communities intensifies this phenomenon in China. 
Internet rumors, of course, are not unique to China. But the authoritarian, tightly controlled 
nature of PRC society and official media makes them more dangerous. When I surf the internet 
and encounter the latest meme, I can crosscheck information against any number of generally 
reliable and authoritative sources. Inside the PRC, citizens have come to rightly distrust the 
mainstream media, leaving them few options—other than scaling the firewall—to verify 
information. Yet, sadly, only a tiny minority of Chinese netizens possess either the skill or the 
desire to access information outside the Chinese intranet. 
There are various scenarios available here. But let me end with two possible (arguably extreme) 
alternatives: 1) an informational cascade, either false or true, spreads rapidly throughout Chinese 
society, and like a virtual prairie fire, undermines the authority and control of the party-state, 
resulting in a mass revolt or political revolution; or 2) the social cascades and filtering power of 
the internet continues to polarize Chinese society, with different social and discourse 
communities walling themselves off from one another, and thus allowing the party-state to easily 
isolate and stamp out any spot fires of dissent. One might hope for the former, but are we not 
already witnessing the latter? 
James Leibold is a Senior Lecturer in Politics and Asian Studies at La Trobe University in 
Australia and one of the co-editors of the forthcoming Critical Han Studies: The History, 
Representation and Identity of China’s Majority (University of California Press). 
 
